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The current designs employed by the U.S. Department of Defense for the 
command and control of special operations forces (SOF) in limited contingency 
environments require reexamination to see whether they are sufficient or can be improved 
to meet the needs of the current operational environment.  Joint Special Operations Task 
Force (JSOTF) and Special Operations Command-Forward (SOC-FWD) structures 
provide a scalable response to identified problems but still primarily operate as closed 
organizations in complex turbulent environments that would be better influenced by an 
open organizational design.  This research examines how existing Marine Special 
Operations Forces, Army Special Operations Forces, and Naval Special Operations 
Forces organizations can meet the demands of complex operational environments at the 
task force level more efficiently.  JSOTFs and SOC-FWDs provide adaptive 
organizations when employed with clear unity of effort and command within a Joint Task 
Force.  Performance is increased when homogenous organizations command and control 
ground SOF during operations, vice using a Theater Special Operations Command, as 
doctrine prescribes. 
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Combined Joint Special Operations Task Forces (CJSOTFs) and Special 
Operations Command-Forwards (SOC-FWDs) for task force (TF) level command and 
control of special operations forces (SOF) have had varying degrees of success across a 
range of operations. The designs are meant to be flexible and adjusted to meet the needs 
of the operating environment, much like an open organization. This research examines 
three case studies including operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, RESTORE HOPE in 
Somalia, and the initial invasion into Afghanistan during Operation ENDURING 
FREEDOM to identify principles of effective command and control. 
In all case studies, the HQ elements formed around existing homogenous 
commands and not a Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) staff with limited 
training and SOF representation.  In Panama, the actual HQ element came from the Joint 
Special Operations Command (JSOC), in Somalia JSOC supported it as well, and 5
th
 
Special Forces Group (SFG) was the primary command and control (C2) organization in 
Afghanistan. In each of these cases, the minimum level of command capable of 
organizing all ground SOF forces was at the O-6 level (Colonel/Captain). In two of the 
cases, the commander was the rank of Major General. Having a leader that outranks the 
leaders of subordinate commands is critical in organizing the force along service lines as 
well as for external coordination with Joint Task Force (JTF) leaders and adjacent 
commands. As future battlefields become more distributed, and actual decision making 
occurs at a lower tactical level, overall operational planning and synchronization will still 
need to occur at the operational or strategic level with minimal interference between the 
two.  
Ultimately, the existing SOF organizations for the C2 of ground forces function, 
but need to be adjusted to the needs of the operating environment to improve 
effectiveness. They are most effective when they effectively achieve unity of effort, a 
clear chain of command, flattened command structure and communications, and have 
clearly delineated and understood tasks. Homogenous units at the group and regimental 
levels or above should be capable of executing these responsibilities on a rotational basis 
 xvi 
based on geographic region. The TSOCs are not ideal for these types of large-scale 
limited contingency operations. The TSOCs should be responsible for maintaining 
accurate intelligence and infrastructure in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs) 
to facilitate units designated to execute C2. If the current prescribed method of having 
TSOCs actually C2 operations persists, United States Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) needs to effectively address the personnel and training shortfalls that 
currently exist within them.  
Key principles derived from the case studies include the following: 
1. When organizations incorporate sound fundamentals, such as full 
integration with conventional force (CF) planning and possessing unity of 
effort with a clear chain of command, they resemble adaptive 
organizations and their likelihood of success is increased dramatically. 
These principles were critical in the outcome of each case study. 
2. Minimizing the chain of command flattens communications between 
ground elements and senior leaders and enables quick decision making 
and reduces ambiguity on the battlefield.  
3. Regionally aligned forces have the potential to better facilitate the 
initiation of operations due to familiarity with the population and terrain. 
This supports a more efficient execution during the initial stages of an 
operation.  
4. Having a leader that outranks the leaders of subordinate commands is 
critical in organizing the force along service lines as well as for external 
coordination with JTF leaders and adjacent commands. 
5. Homogenous commands including Marine special operations forces 
(MARSOF), Army special operations forces (ARSOF), and Naval special 
operations forces (NAVSOF) have the ability to be staffed and trained to 
provide a more effective response for command and control than a TSOC. 
The actual success of a TF level command and control element is also affected by 
a number of additional factors that this research did not address, such as command 
climate, fiscal resources, and logistics support available, etc. This research is not meant to 
provide all-encompassing guidance to commanders, but rather is to be used as a tool that 
demonstrates how certain principles have had positive and negative effects in prior SOF 
operations and how they can influence future operations.  
xvii 
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 1 
I. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The current organizational design for the command and control of ground special 
operations forces (SOF) in limited contingency environments may not be sufficient to 
meet the needs of the current operational environment. The commonly used centralized 
and decentralized command structures are the Joint Special Operations Task Force 
(JSOTF) and the Special Operations Command Forward (SOC-FWD), respectively. They 
are used for a variety of mission sets and have been adopted as the standard for 
organizational design regardless of the mission requirements or operating environments. 
As the demand for the tactical utilization of ground SOF in limited contingencies grows, 
SOF command and control organizations should seek to operate with maximum 
efficiency while still maintaining the expertise required for successful execution. For 
these reasons, the current organizational design deserves re-examination to evaluate its 
functionality in anticipated operations. 
Limited contingency operations lie in the middle of the range of a military 
operations continuum between major combat operations and security engagement and 
deterrence operations.1 Doctrinally, these operations are defined as “small scale, limited-
duration operations, such as strikes, raids, and peace enforcement, which might include 
combat depending on the circumstances. Commanders conduct these operations 
individually, in simultaneous or concurrent groupings, or in conjunction with a major 
operation or campaign.”2  
These types of operations can easily encompass the range of SOF core activities 
prescribed in JP 3–05 Special Operations including: 
 direct action  
 special reconnaissance  
                                                 
1 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations (JP 3–0) (Washington,  DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), I-5. 
2 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, I-5. 
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 countering weapons of mass destruction 
 counterterrorism 
 unconventional warfare 
 foreign internal defense 
 security force assistance 
 hostage rescue and recovery 
 counterinsurgency 
 foreign humanitarian assistance 
 military information support operations 
 civil affairs operations3 
Each of these activities requires differing levels of coordination, support, and 
knowledge of the assigned operational area to be effectively executed. 
If this is the case, then why are generic solutions applied to each of these 
problems? 
JSOTFs utilized in limited contingency operations are primarily composite units, 
with their headquarters formed primarily from Theater Special Operations Command 
(TSOC) staffs. These organizations are ad-hoc centralized command and control 
organizations that often lack sub-regional focus, cohesion, and responsiveness.  
SOC-FWDs are built as a subordinate unit to the TSOC and are principally 
manned with TSOC personnel, but generally have a large number of augmented 
personnel from outside of the command. The SOC-FWDs are standing organizations that 
are more cohesive, regionally focused, and possess the potential for increased 
responsiveness to local problems. The usage of SOC-FWDs is inhibited due to manpower 
constraints within the TSOCs. 
                                                 
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations (JP 3–05) (Washington,  DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), I-
3. 
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 Neither of these organizational designs provides an optimal solution to support 
any single SOF core activity, let alone multiple core activities, in limited contingency 
operations. To achieve a more efficient balance between core activity command and 
control requirements for SOF and organizational design, the United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) should examine other options for command and 
control of ground SOF. These options could range from the traditional JSOTFs and SOC-
FWDs, to regionally aligned command and control units, to command and controlled 
contingency units amongst others. Having a more flexible menu of organizational designs 
suited to support core SOF activities needed in limited contingencies enables USSOCOM 
to gain efficiencies within its limited force structure.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What principles of command and control are essential for task force level SOF 
headquarters employment in limited contingency environments?  
C. THESIS SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis will be limited to exploring the command and control of 
non-tiered ground SOF units (MARSOC, USASOC, AFSOC, and NSW) and their 
application of core SOF activities in limited contingency environments. In limited 
contingency operations, except when existing operations plans (OPLANS) and operations 
orders (OPORDS) are utilized, SOF command and control organizations are established 
in response to an external event and are not pre-planned.  
This thesis will not address ground SOF command and control in large-scale 
major operations and campaigns, counter weapons of mass destruction, and hostage 
rescue/recovery. In major operations and campaigns, it is normal for SOF integration to 
be formally established well prior to execution and is not done solely in response to a 
specific event. Countering weapons of mass destruction and hostage rescue are primarily 
executed by tiered SOF units (JSOC) that have specific command and control procedures 
established for execution of these missions and therefore are omitted.  
 4 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The effectiveness of a command and control organization is dependent on its 
ability to achieve its operational tasks through the execution of its assigned core 
activities. The successful execution of these tasks is further supported through the 
implementation of the joint functions. JP 3–0 describes the joint functions as “related 
capabilities and activities grouped together to help Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) 
integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations.”4 The joint functions include the 
following:  
 command and control  
 intelligence  
 fires  
 movement and maneuver  
 force protection and logistics 
as prescribed in JP1-0.5  Effective implementation of the joint functions enables 
 organizing of the force  
 developing of operational areas and control measures  
 establishing command relationships  
 providing operational direction and guidance  
 maintaining SOF planning and targeting processes.6  
 SOF has used different command and control models, both centralized and 
decentralized to achieve these effects. 
Using case studies of ground SOF command and control units employed in 
limited contingency operations offers the opportunity to conduct detailed analysis that 
                                                 
4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, III-I. 
5 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-0, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (JP 1-
0) (Washington,  DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013)I-17-19. 
6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, A-2-3. 
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identifies the strengths of each command structure, core-activity support requirements, 
and requirements to accomplish assigned tasks effectively.  
Case studies covering varying methods of employment of special operations 
forces in limited contingencies will be utilized. The case studies focus on a variety of 
missions executed in multiple geographic areas. The variety of missions helps address the 
wide scope of how the Department of Defense (DOD) defines limited contingency 
operations. The planning timeline for limited contingency operations also ranges broadly 
and can be very rapid as is seen during crisis response operations or take many months or 
even longer for other contingencies. The cases under consideration are Operation JUST 
CAUSE (Panama), USSOF in Somalia (1992-1993), and the initiation of Operation 
ENDURING FREEDOM Afghanistan (OEF-A). These cases were chosen because they 
represent a variety of geographic regions, timelines for planning, and operational 
considerations on the ground. These cases are not all encompassing of SOF command 
and control, but cover a wide range of operations that apply to most forms of SOF 
employment in limited contingencies. In each of these cases, the circumstances 
surrounding the employment of SOF and the ability of the assigned headquarters element 
to achieve its operational requirements will be addressed. 
By examining a variety of organizational designs using comparative assessments, 
a greater understanding of what is critical to the success of command and ground of 
ground SOF forces in limited contingency operations can be developed. 
  
 6 
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II. ADAPTABLE ORGANIZATIONS AND CURRENT 
PRESCRIBED SOF COMMAND AND CONTROL 
ORGANIZATIONS FOR GROUND FORCES IN LIMITED 
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 
A. ADAPTABLE ORGANIZATIONS 
On April 24, 1980, eight servicemembers died and two aircraft were lost during 
the execution of operation EAGLE CLAW while attempting to rescue U.S. hostages held 
in Tehran, Iran.  The mission was complex and had an unclear chain of command as well 
as forced participation of each of the armed services. The mission failed for a variety of 
reasons, including but not limited to lack of logistical redundancy, poor planning, and 
poor command and control. The failed mission was a low point for American special 
operations, but could have been one of the most revered special operations in history, had 
it had the proper planning and command and control (C2) in place to facilitate its success. 
The planners and the C2 element did not adapt to the complexities of the mission and its 
personnel did not work together fluidly.7  
The current organizational design for the command and control of ground special 
operations forces (SOF) in limited contingency environments may not be sufficient to 
meet the needs of the current operations. The commonly used centralized and 
decentralized command structures are the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) 
and the Special Operations Command Forward (SOC-FWD), respectively. They are the 
standard for ground SOF C2 organizational design regardless of the mission requirements 
or operating environments. As the demand for the tactical utilization of ground SOF in 
limited contingencies grows, SOF command and control organizations should seek to 
operate with maximum efficiency while still maintaining the expertise required for 
successful execution. For these reasons, the current organizational design deserves 
reexamination to evaluate its functionality in anticipated operations. 
                                                 
7 Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah: The Iran Hostage Crisis: The First Battle in America’s War 
with Militant Islam (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006), 431–468. 
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In business, if the changing needs of the consumer cannot be addressed the 
business is more likely to fail.8 If the business is able to adapt to the unique demands of 
the environment, the chance of success improves greatly. This approach, applied to SOF 
command and control organizations operating within the demands of ever-changing 
limited contingency environments, appears as a viable objective. Doctrinally, there is 
little guidance to assist commanders in understanding how to structure their command 
and control organizations to address their required core activities within the demands of 
the assigned operating environment.  
In the business world, a static environment where profits and competition can be 
clearly predicted does not exist with the exception of monopolies and utility companies.9 
The reality is that even with some level of predictability, within the environment there 
always remains some level of unpredictability. Civil engineer Gabriel Pall states that “as 
long as change is reasonably predictable, organizations can plan a variety of ways to deal 
with it. However, when change becomes unpredictable, unplanned, or unscheduled, 
planned responses are no longer meaningful in light of the rapidity of change. The only 
effective response strategy is that of continual adaptation.”10  
Prior to the 1950s, business organizational design models focused on a centralized 
command structure that was very hierarchical in nature. These closed or highly 
centralized organizations focused on stability and relied on rules, regulations, and 
standard operating procedures as described by organizational theorists Henry 
Mintzberg11 and  Erik Jansen.12 These organizations utilized specialized capabilities 
throughout the organization, coupled with formalized structure, but lacked in training.13  
These organizational structures still exist, but are more “appropriate for firms employing 
                                                 
8 Gabriel A. Pall, The Process-Centered Enterprise: The Power of Commitments (Boca Raton, FL: St. 
Lucie Press, 2000), 15–21. 
9 Pall, The Process-Centered Enterprise, 4. 
10 Pall, The Process-Centered Enterprise, 4. 
11 Henry Mintzberg, Mintzberg on Management (New York, NY:, The Free Press, 1989), 11–31. 
12 Erik Jansen, “Mintzberg Configuration” (recorded lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA, January 25, 2011), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/46146. 
13 Jansen, “Mintzberg Configuration.” 
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mass-production technologies”14 and are not well suited for the emerging technology 
market.  
In the 1950s, organizational theorists identified that many businesses operating in 
highly structured closed systems were effective at mechanical production but struggled to 
meet changes required as new technologies emerged. This was primarily applicable to 
technologically driven industry that was constantly operating in turbulence.15 Theorists 
realized that “different types or species of organizations are needed in different types of 
environments.”16 This prompted the development of open or adaptive organizations. 
These organizations aimed at operating in a more decentralized manner in order to 
increase responsiveness to the demands of their operating environments. Today this is the 
norm for many businesses operating in a competitive global market. 
By definition, limited contingency operations operate in this realm. These 
operations rest within the middle of the range of military operations continuum amongst 
major combat operations and security engagement and deterrence operations.17 Existing 
operations plans (OPLANS) and contingency plans (CONPLANS) address potential 
predicted actions by our enemies and our allies. These update as the priorities and 
security strategy of the United States evolves over time. Limited contingencies usually 
constitute unpredictable events that require a reactive response rather than proactive 
planning. Utilizing a limited playbook of options, SOF commanders often find 
themselves running a closed organization for operations that potentially require the 
flexibility of an adaptive organization. During operation EAGLE CLAW, this was the 
case. The solution developed was not specific to the problem and organized with a 
holistic understanding of the operating environment.  
                                                 
14 Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization (Updated Edition of the International Bestseller) 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2006), 47. 
15 Morgan, Images of Organization, 46–49. 
16 Morgan, Images of Organization, 42. 
17 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, I-5. 
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B.  CURRENTLY PRESCRIBED SOF COMMAND AND CONTROL 
ORGANIZATIONS FOR LIMITED CONTINGENCIES 
U.S. joint forces define C2 as “the exercise of authority and direction by a 
properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment 
of the mission.”18 This definition supports other amplifying guidance including, “C2 
functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, 
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, 
directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of 
the mission.”19 Essentially, command gives, among other things, legal authority to an 
individual commander to direct operations. Control is the means in how they effectively 
coordinates and execute these operations. The range of authorities varies greatly 
depending on the level of command with the ultimate military responsibility residing with 
the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) Commander.20 The GCC in-turn relies on 
their subordinate Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) Commander to 
supervise the utilization of SOF assigned to the area of operational responsibility (AOR). 
As contingencies develop, the TSOC Commander assigns personnel to establish 
command and control elements to support the GCC, normally in the form of a Special 
Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF). In accordance with JP 1–0,  
the SOJTF is the principal joint SOF organization tasked to meet all 
special operations requirements in major operations, campaigns, or a 
contingency….A SOJTF is a modular, tailorable, and scalable SOF 
organization that allows United States Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) to more efficiently provide integrated, fully capable, and 
enabled joint SOF to GCCs and subordinate Joint Force Commanders 
(JFCs) based on the strategic, operational, and tactical context.21  
The SOJTF is generally responsible for administering all SOF requirements under 
the Joint Task Force (JTF), including aviation, ground, maritime, special missions units, 
                                                 
18 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, GL-5. 
19 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, V-14. 
20 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, GL-5. 
21 Joint Chief of Staff, Special Operations, III-4. 
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and may even serve as the JTF Commander.22 The TSOC primarily sources these 
organizations, but USSOCOM can also directly source the personnel if the demand 
exceeds the TSOC’s capacity.23 Within a SOJTF or TSOC, the ground SOF components 
evolve into subordinate JSOTF’s and SOC-FWDs. During limited contingency 
operations, the JSOTF and the SOC-FWD may be independent of a SOJTF and work 
directly for the TSOC. These designs focus on incorporating traditional military 
command and control capabilities. Both designs mimic conventional military staff 
structure and are the most frequently prescribed ground SOF command and control 
elements used in limited contingency operations.  
The effectiveness of these command and control organizations is dependent on 
their ability to achieve operational and tactical tasks. Both organizations execute these 
tasks through the implementation of the joint functions. “Joint functions are related 
capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct 
joint operations.”24 The joint functions include command and control, intelligence, fires, 
movement and maneuver, force protection, and sustainment (logistics). Joint doctrine 
further dictates that SOF command and control organizations effectively implement the 
joint functions to enable the organizing of the force, development of operational areas 
and control measures, establish command relationships, provide operational direction and 
guidance, and maintain SOF mission planning and targeting.25 This guidance promotes a 
flexible and adaptive task organized command and control design, but often administered 
in a highly standardized structure as displayed in Figure 1 
                                                 
22 Joint Chief of Staff, Special Operations, III-4-5. 
23 Joint Chief of Staff, Special Operations, III-4-17. 
24 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, III-I. 
25 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, A-2-3. 
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Figure 1.  SOF C2 Node Options26 
An example of this structure’s implementation is the ground SOF C2 structure 
used in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in the years following the initial 
invasion. Under the oversight of SOJTF-Afghanistan fell CJSOTF-Afghanistan 
(CJSOTF-A). CJSOTF-A presided over the day-to-day implementation of strategy and 
                                                 
26 Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, III-13. 
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joint function support throughout the operation. CJSOTF-A further delegated C2 duties 
into regionally aligned SOTFs to provide even more localized support.27 
1. The Joint Special Operations Task Force 
The centralized SOF ground command and control model comes in the form of a 
Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) formed within a TSOC: “a JSOTF is 
generally composed of units of two or more SOF Service components formed to 
unilaterally carry out specific special operations or activities, or to support a JFC 
conducting joint operations.”28  JSOTFs have been the primary method for the command 
and control of ground SOF units in limited contingencies. This structure replicates formal 
military structure with the primary variation in its employment coming from the number 
of personnel utilized. “A JSOTF staff is normally drawn from the TSOC staff and 
augmented by Service components or an existing O-6-level HQ from an existing SOF 
Service component with augmentation from other SOF or Conventional Force (CF).”29 
This is the most commonly applied manner in which ground SOF are commanded and 
controlled in limited contingency environments. This assignment of personnel requires 
rapid cohesion and understanding of procedures.  
The initial establishment of a JSOTF staff presents significant 
organizational, planning, and training considerations. These considerations 
normally involve the ability to rapidly fuse a core SOF-staff with a diverse 
group of key CF augmentees, who may have varying degrees of 
understanding and experience in special operations, into a functioning 
staff for the JSOTF. Therefore, key SOF personnel assigned to a JSOTF 
staff, as well as those key personnel who coordinate with a JSOTF HQ, 
should understand JSOTF staff operating procedures, and special 
operations techniques and procedures in general, to enable timely 
establishment of the JSOTF, and initiation of planning and execution of 
special operations.30 
                                                 
27 Based on author’s personal experienced during multiple CJSOTF-A deployments during OEF. The 
author spent over 18 months deployed operating in SOF teams and SOF company billets within CJSOTF-
A. 
28 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, III-7. 
29 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, III-7-8. 
30 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, A-1. 
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The problem with primarily staffing a JSOTF with members from the TSOC staff 
is twofold. First, the TSOC is still responsible for executing routine functions as the 
regional SOF commander in addition to supporting the JSOTF.31 Outside of small-scale 
short duration requirements, the loss of key personnel throughout the TSOC results in 
decreased operational capacity and effectiveness. The second problem is that the staff of 
the JSOTF “should understand JSOTF staff operating procedures and special operations 
techniques in general.”32 The average TSOC staff is primarily composed of conventional 
force personnel with no SOF experience.  SOF normally fill key leadership billets, but 
there is little depth in SOF experience beyond these personnel.  This deficiency requires 
the TSOC to undergo increased training of personnel while maintaining current 
operational capacity to achieve a baseline proficiency to run a JSOTF. This is not ideal 
for an organization that has high turnover rates and has a majority of personnel that, at 
least initially, do not have the appropriate depth to effectively man a JSOTF. 
Doctrinally, JSOTFs are supposed to be flexible organizations built according to 
the needs of the mission. The aforementioned struggles in staffing a JSOTF with TSOC 
personnel make this very difficult. A TSOC is inherently a stable, centralized 
organization that is reliant on standard operating procedures, rules, and regulations to 
function. Without this structure, the personnel within the TSOC would struggle to 
execute daily tasks due to their limited SOF capabilities and high turnover. In turn, when 
JSOTFs are established they normally replicate Figure 2. This design plays to the 
strengths of the staff that comes primarily from a conventional operational background as 
it mimics conventional command and control configurations. This structure is pre-
determined based on internal deficiencies and does not address the requirements of the 
potential operating environment. The JSOTF is supposed to be scalable, but rarely 
deploys with anything below the standard configuration (Figure 2) unless there are 
external constraints emplaced on the TSOC/GCC Commander such as force caps. 
                                                 
31 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, A-2. 
32 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, A-1. 
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Figure 2.  Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Organization33 
An example of the CJSOTF concept gone awry is Task Force (TF) Ranger 
implemented during the execution of United Nations Somalia II (UNOSOM II).  The 
U.S. military deployed a 440-man CJSOTF to support operations under the command of 
CENTCOM.34 The CJSOTF did not fall under the control of UNOSOM forces or under 
U.S. Forces Somalia (USFORSOM). The name of the CJSOTF was TF Ranger and its C2 
element was comprised of JSOC personnel who had little previous understanding of the 
operational area and, in this case, was not operationally synchronized with conventional 
force counterparts.35 TF Ranger ended in failure after suffering over 18 dead servicemen 
and losing multiple helicopters in the battle of Mogadishu.  
The use of a JSOTF during the initial entry into Afghanistan provided a much 
better result than its predecessor in Somalia. This is discussed in Chapter IV. Doctrine 
                                                 
33 Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, A-5 
34 Walter S. Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia, August 1992-March 1994 (Washington,  DC: Joint 
History Office, 2005), 48. 
35 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 134–142.  
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does provide an alternative option, the Special Operations Command–Forward (SOC-
FWD). 
2. Special Operations Command-Forward 
The more decentralized variant of executing command and control of ground SOF 
forces is the Special Operations Command-Forward (SOC-FWD) concept. This 
organization is designed to be more adaptive to its surrounding environment but it still 
replicates the structure of the traditional military establishment and is limited in its actual 
flexibility.  
A SOC-FWD is normally smaller than a TSOC, and a tailored, 
operational-level HQ that provides a forward-deployed, persistent 
presence, and C2 capability…The SOC-FWD develops a close working 
relationship with the associated country team, HN forces, and any MNFs 
or IGOs within the HN, and helps the CDRTSOC in the role of 
JFC/CDRJSOTF, and as the senior theater special operations advisor to 
the GCC.36 
The SOC-FWD concept was initially championed by former USSOCOM 
Commander Admiral William McRaven in 2011 as part of the development of the 
“Global SOF Network” (GSN). The GSN was an effort to develop a network that 
“consists of a globally networked force of Special Operations Forces (SOF), interagency 
allies and partners able to rapidly respond to, and persistently address, regional 
contingencies and threats to stability.”37 The SOC-FWD concept has since been 
introduced formally into the most recent Special Operations Joint Publication JP 3–05 
Special Operations in 2014 as a possible means to command and control SOF forces.38 
Each SOC-FWD is built differently, but the key difference between it and a traditional 
JSOTF is that it is a standing, forward-deployed organization focused on a particular 
region and not a short-term response to an incident that has already occurred.39 
                                                 
36 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, III-5. 
37 Thomas S. Szayna and Welser IV, Developing and Assessing Options for the Global SOF Network 
(RAND report RR340), 1. Accessed April 11, 2016. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
research_reports/RR300/RR340/RAND_RR340.pdf.  
38 Szayna and Welser, Developing and Assessing Options for the Global SOF Network, 1. 
39 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, III-5. 
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The SOC-FWD concept breaks down large combatant command areas into sub-
regions or even specific countries. Within this reduced geographic area of focus, a 
standing command coordinates all SOF activities in the area. This enables the 
organization to have a detailed understanding of the operational area and have a 
functioning staff in place if a limited contingency or crisis develops. Since they are 
already forward they may have the ability to identify that the conditions for conflict or 
crisis are developing and, in turn, utilize preventative measures to help pacify the area 
before the situation escalates.40 This command staffed primarily from the TSOC, but 
resourced with augments from commands outside of the USSOCOM enterprise.41 
The SOC-FWD concept, utilized in some historical hot spots such as Lebanon and 
Africa, often requires additional staffing that the TSOCs cannot provide. This creates a 
need for continuous augmentation to the SOC-FWD from external SOF and conventional 
force commands. With the persistent personnel shortfalls throughout the SOF 
community, it is impractical to establish numerous SOC-FWDs in their current design. 
Existing SOC-FWDs also face the manning deficiencies that affect a JSOTF. Since the 
TSOC is the primary force provider and there is a high rate of turnover due to numerous 
augmentees, similar centralized organizational design measures are required to function. 
This promotes the likelihood of the organization operating in a more centralized manner 
and not operating at its optimal capacity.  
The benefit of regional specialization and enhanced coordination capabilities with 
adjacent and vertical organizations make this design more de-centralized in nature, but its 
personnel requirements remain a deficiency. 
The invasion of Panama during operation JUST CAUSE provided a command 
structure for SOF that the SOC-FWD designs mimic. Special Operations Command 




 Special Forces Group (SFG), both located in 
Panama, contributed heavily to the initial planning of the operation and then augmented 
                                                 
40 Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, USN Commander, United States Special 
Operations Command before the 113th Congress House Armed Services Committee (Washington,  DC, 
2013), 4. 
41 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, III-12. 
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the JSOTF when it was established.42 The current SOC-FWDs support daily operations 
planning and coordination much in the same manner as SOCSOUTH did during JUST 
CAUSE and can integrate into a larger command structure if the requirement arises. The 
execution of JUST CAUSE was a successful example of SOF C2 and the forward 




 SFG were critical in the planning 
process due to their knowledge of the operational area and understanding the political and 
social dynamics of the environment. This operation was unique in that there was an 
exceptionally detailed understanding of the battlefield during planning and execution. 
C.  ASSESSMENT/POTENTIAL OPTIONS 
Both current designs operate as closed systems despite advertising themselves as 
flexible, adaptive organizations that focus on the environment, as is an open system. 
These designs mimic a conventional command structure in rank and responsibility 
instead of focusing solely on mission requirements to achieve joint function integration 
for mission accomplishment. Both the JSOTF and SOC-FWD attempt to replicate full-
functionality maintained in rear area commands. Both models are scalable, but 
traditionally to stick to the conventional military hierarchical design.  
Limited contingency operations should require an open organizational design 
approach to solve complex problems in an ever-changing environment. The organization 
tasked with providing command and control to ground SOF units needs to possess 
internal flexibility while still addressing the need of the hierarchical military 
establishment. At the same time, this organization needs to be as expeditionary as 
possible and reduce bureaucratic layers to increase the efficiency in decision-making. 
This will require a radical shift from the execution used in the employment of the current 
models. 
Potential options in addition to the existing structures that exist within the current 
force structure may include the utilization of regionally aligned forces and the 
                                                 
42 Lawrence A. Yates, The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama : Origins, Planning, and Crisis 
Management, June 1987-December 1989 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States 
Army, 2008), 43–50. 
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establishment of command and control contingency units. Both could utilize existing 
force structure to provide an enhanced response capability for limited contingency 
operations. 
 Regionally Aligned SOF a.
Within each TSOC, there exists a mixture of regionally aligned SOF that includes 
Marine Special Operations Forces, Army Special Operations Forces, and Naval Special 
Warfare commands that could form the core of a JSOTF or SOC-FWD like structure. 
These forces can theoretically be postured to perform the core command and control 
responsibilities required of a JSOTF or SOC-FWD with minor augmentation from the 
TSOCs or their parent commands. Since regionally aligned, forward deployed 
organizations already exist; they can provide many of the positive effects of a JSOTF and 
SOC-FWD with minimal impact on other TSOC/GCC operational responsibilities. Using 
a core force may enable the TSOC Commander to maintain OPCON of the operation in 
support of the GCC while providing increased responsiveness. The commander of this 
force would most likely need to be an O-6 or above from the TSOC to provide 
authorities, top-cover, and potentially serve as the Joint Forces SOF Component 
Commander (JFSOCC).43 The operations cell and the remaining staff should be primarily 
reliant on the forward deployed regionally aligned commands. 
Since these regionally aligned commands are provided to the TSOC on a rotating 
basis from the same parent units, a consistent task organization and level of capability is 
easily established. The TSOC will also know what deficiencies each unit has and what is 
required to augment the commands to achieve the appropriate effects. Utilizing these 
forward assets would enable the TSOC to maintain focus on the larger picture while 
allowing these regionally focused units to maintain a high degree of understanding of 
their assigned sub-regions and complement the TSOC as needed to command and control 
ground SOF forces. This has a similar benefit to a SOC-FWD in that the regionally 
                                                 
43 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, III-7-8. 
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aligned forces can also help to identify and remedy problems before they escalate into a 
limited contingency or crisis.44  
An additional benefit of using regionally aligned forces to establish the core of a 
ground SOF command and control organization would be the ability to achieve greater 
continuity within the force. Since these forces would are composed of O-4 level 
commands, they can be replaced with other O-4 commands from their organic battalions 
during long duration limited contingency operations. This would provide units with like 
capabilities, similar training, and increased understanding of the battlespace for an 
indefinite period. 
 Command and Control Contingency Units b.
Another option would be to assign command and control contingency battalions. 
Essentially, this would entail a rotational assignment of SOF battalion level headquarters 
to provide on-call command and control for limited contingency operations in each GCC. 
This is a radical departure for theater SOF, but has been employed in conventional forces 
in the past. This would reduce the strain on TSOC personnel, but would introduce a series 
of standing readiness requirements for battalions in the rotation. This model varies the 
most dramatically from the normally prescribed organizational design, but should be 
considered to test the validity of the current models. This method can be integrated in 
multiple formats in addition to the aforementioned description.  
Both of these models would be reliant on the incorporation of remote support or 
reach back for assets such as intelligence, and logistics. This facilitates a reduction in the 
organization’s personnel and equipment footprint and the forward logistics requirements. 
Being light and flexible increases the ability to adapt to the environment as well reduces 
the logistical footprint and increases responsiveness. 
                                                 
44 Department of the Army, Special Operations (ADP 3–05) (Washington,  DC: Department of the 
Army, 2012), II-12. 
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D. EVALUATING GROUND SOF COMMAND AND CONTROL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
The effectiveness of a command and control organization is dependent on its 
ability to execute its core activities of “synchronizing and/or implementing joint force 
activities” while completing its operational and tactical tasks.45 Operational tasks 
prescribed in JP 1–0 Joint Command and Control include: 
 establishing support relationships and authorities among subordinate units 
 giving direction to subordinate units required to complete missions 
assigned to the command 
 identifying the chain of command 
 organizing and employing subordinate forces as required to carry out 
assigned missions 
 identifying and prioritizing the intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) requirements for the command 
 relieving from duty officers assigned to the command if deemed necessary 
 establishing operational coordination requirements for subordinate 
commanders for routine events 
 establishing areas of operational responsibility (AORs) among subordinate 
commanders to ensure adequate local defense subordinate commanders. 
These activities are designed to ensure synchronization amongst subordinate elements.46 
Tactical tasks include “giving direction for military operations” and “controlling 
designated forces.”47 These tasks are achieved through the implementation of the joint 
functions: “joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help 
JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations.”48 The joint functions include 
command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, force protection, and 
                                                 
45 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-0, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, V-
14. 
46 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-0, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, V 
6-7. 
47 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-0, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, V-7. 
48 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, III-I. 
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sustainment (logistics).49 Effective implementation of the joint functions enables the 
organizing of the force, developing of operational areas and control measures, 
establishment of command relationships, providing operational direction and guidance, 
and maintaining the SOF planning and targeting processes.50 SOF has traditionally used 
JSOTFs and SOC-FWDs to achieve these effects. The question is not whether these 
organizations can complete the mission, but rather are they doing it effectively and 
efficiently.  
 Using case studies of ground SOF command and control units employed in a 
variety of missions will assist in highlighting both tangible and intangible aspects of C2 
that contribute to success and failure. Each case study overviews the mission background, 
missions assigned to ground SOF, unit organization, and operational effectiveness.  
E. FACTORS CONSIDERED IN EVALUATIONS 
The dependent factors or outcomes to be evaluated are the tasks required of SOF 
command and control elements as directed in JP 3–05, Special Operations. These factors 
are organizing the force, considering operational areas and control measures, establishing 
command relationships, providing special operations operational direction and guidance, 
and maintaining the SOF planning and targeting processes.51  
The independent factors evaluated include size of the force, proximity of 
command and control headquarters, forced joint SOF integration, time from 
establishment of the command and control organization to its employment, seniority of 
the force commander, and SOF experience of the force commander.  
1. Defining the Factors 
Dependent Factors- the definitions for the dependent factors are derived directly 
from JP 3–05, Special Operations.52  
                                                 
49 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-0, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, I-
17-19. 
50 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, A-2-3. 
51 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, A-2-3. 
52 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, A-3. 
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 Organizing the force- “CDRJSOTF organizes forces over which he has 
OPCON. CDRJSOTF also organizes the JSOTF HQ to assist in the control 
of SOF, provide support to subordinate SOF units, and coordinate with 
other JTFs and components as required.”53 
 Considering operational areas and control measures- “SOF-CF integration 
requires a well-structured C2 architecture and coordination process 
between the CDRJSOTF, JFC, and among all their components.”54 
 Establishing command relationships- “The CDRJSOTF exercises OPCON 
through subordinate SOF Service/functional component commanders or 
subordinate CDRJSOTFs.”55 
 Providing special operations direction and guidance- “For planning and 
execution, the CDRJSOTF provides the commander’s intent, guidance, 
and objectives to JSOTF component commanders. For employment, the 
CDRJSOTF provides timely and concise missions or tasks to each 
component and subordinate commander.”56 
 Maintaining integrity and quality of SOF mission planning and targeting 
processes- “The establishing JFC and supporting components should 
understand SOF mission planning and targeting processes. The integrity 
and quality of the SOF mission planning and targeting processes rely on 
well-informed decisions by JFCs/CDRJSOTFs.”57 
2. Additional Factors 
 Size of the force- This is being used to determine if the size of the staff has 
any implications on operational effectiveness. 
 Proximity of command and control headquarters- Proximity is defined as 
the physical location of the headquarters commanding and controlling 
ground SOF operations.  
 Forced joint SOF integration- Forced integration evaluates the 
composition of the force and its effects on outcomes 
 Time from establishment of the command and control organization to its 
employment- This factor examines the length of time required from the 
identification of a limited contingency operation to the employment of the 
                                                 
53 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, A-3. 
54 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, A-3. 
55 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, A-3.  
56 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, A-3. 
57 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, A-3. 
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ground SOF command and control element. This time is calculated from 
the approval of an execution order to the actual deployment of forces. 
 Seniority of the force commander- This factor examines the depth of 
experience required to effectively employ forces in limited contingency 
operations. The experience is evaluated on the rank of the commanding 
officer of the ground SOF component 
 Commander’s SOF Experience- This factor assesses the SOF experience 
of the commanding officer to determine its’ influence on the successful 
outcome of the deployment of ground SOF forces 
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III. OPERATION JUST CAUSE 
A. BACKGROUND 
After the Spanish-American War, it became apparent to the United States that it 
required a faster means of moving vessels and cargo than the existing Cape Horn route.58 
The United States decided to coordinate a treaty with Colombia in its efforts to build a 
canal in Panama which was under Colombian control at that time.59 When the Colombian 
Senate refused to approve the treaty, President Theodore Roosevelt “threw his support to 
the cause of Panamanian independence..”60 This resulted in a popular revolt in Panama 
during November, 1903. President Roosevelt provided support to the rebels and the 
Panama secured its independence from Panama in days.61 
The United States leveraged its support for the rebellion into the Hay-Bunau-
Varilla Treaty. This treaty provided the United States the rights to “build, use, and 
defend” a canal that bisected Panama.62 The canal was completed in 1914. Over time the 
U.S. presence drew the ire of many locals and eventually in the late 1970s they the U.S. 
agreed to remove its permanent military forces by the year 2000 and turn over the 
operation of the canal to Panama as long as the canal operations remained uninterrupted 
via the Panama Canal Treaty.63 1n 1981, the Panamanian leader who had signed the 
treaty, General Omar Torrijos, was killed in a plane crash created an unstable military 
dominated government. By 1983 General Manuel Noriega, formerly Torrijos’ top 
intelligence officer, took charge over the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF).  Noriega’s 
involvement with numerous illicit activities made him difficult for the United States to 
work with though he worked closely with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). As the 
                                                 
58 Yates, The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama June 1987 – December 1989, 2. 
59 Yates, The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama June 1987 – December 1989, 3. 
60 Yates, The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama June 1987 – December 1989, 3. 
61 Yates, The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama June 1987 – December 1989, 3. 
62 Yates, The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama June 1987 – December 1989, 3. 
63 Ronald H. Cole, Operation Just Cause : The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in 
Panama, February 1988-January 1990 (Washington,  DC: Joint History Office, 1995), 5. 
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United States increased its pressure for him to resign, the dictator became more 
unpredictable and the security of Panama began to deteriorate.64 
B. MISSION PLANNING 
As the security situation continued to become degraded, the United States began 
planning for limited contingency operations to remove Noriega after diplomatic measures 
failed.65 The initial plan, ELABORATE MAZE, was developed in 1988 and quickly 
evolved into OPLAN BLUE SPOON, the plan to remove Noriega. The planning process 
was benefited by the exisitng U.S. military infrastructure and staff in Panama as well the 
potential to consolidate command and control under the provisions of the Goldwater-
Nichols Defense Reoorganization Act of 1986.66 Command and control (C2) of the entire 
operation was designated to United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) who in 
turn appointed Liutenant General (LtGen) Carl Stiner as Commander of Joint Task Force-
South (JTFSO). LtGen. Stiner’s headquarters from the XVIII Airborne Corps would be 
responsible for the bulk of the planning and coordination for the operation. When 
USSOUTHCOM consolidated overall C2 of the enitre operation under JTFSO it 
promoted ease of planning and coordination between all involved units.67 As depicted 
in Figure 3, JTFSO was organized with an “emphasis on a majority of single service 
forces, while remaining a joint operation.”68 This structure ensured “every group 
from the platoon to the task force level worked for JTF South,” including all SOF.69  
64 Cole, Operation Just Cause, 6–7. 
65 Michael E. Seitz, “Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) Factors,” in, 
Operation Just Cause: The U.S. Intervention in Panama, ed. Bruce W. Watson and Peter Tsouras (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1991), 105. 
66 Cole, Operation Just Cause, 1. 
67 Cole, Operation Just Cause, 17–18. 
68 Watson and Tsouras, Operation Just Cause, 110. 
69 Watson and Tsouras, Operation Just Cause, 107. 
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Figure 3.  Operation JUST CAUSE Task Organization70 
During planning United States Special Operations Command South 
(SOCSOUTH) identified that it did not have the capacity to control all special operations 
units assigned for the operation. SOCSOUTH had limited personnel and still maintained 
other operational commitments throughout the region. They were however able to assisit 
with the planning.71 Control of SOF for the mission was given to the Joint Special 
Operations Command led by Major General (MGen) Wayne Downing. The JSOTF, led 
by MGen Downing, “reported directly to Stiner throughout the operation” facilitating 
unity of command and effort throughout execution.72 
On December 15, 1989, the “Panamanian National Assembly passed a resolution 
that stated ‘owing to U.S. aggression’ a state of war existed with the United States.”73 
The next day three Marine officers were wounded by Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) 
at a checkpoint. Marine 1st Lieutenant Robert Paz died of his wounds shortly thereafter. 
The following day, President George Bush approved the plan. This set the stage for the 
deployment of CONUS-based forces within 48 hours in order to execute H-Hour on the 
70 Adapted from Edward M. Flanagan, Battle for Panama : Inside Operation Just Cause (New York, 
NY: Brassey’s, 1993). 
71 Yates, The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama June 1987 – December 1989, 43–47. 
72 Donnelly, Operation Just Cause, 113. 
73 Cole, Operation Just Cause, 27. (This followed a series of escalations by the Panamanian 
government in its harassment of U.S. personnel stationed in Panama) 
































night of 20th.74 With the dissemination of the execution order BLUE SPOON was 
renamed JUST CAUSE.  
C. TASK ORGANIZATION OF GROUND SOF 
The JSOTF employed for JUST CAUSE consisted of approximately 4,150 
personnel, a signifigant percentage of the total force deployed.75 The task organization of 
ground SOF mirrored that of much of the conventional force strucure in that 
each subordinate element was broken down by service (Figure 4). This facilated 
identification of appropriate missions and improved unity of effort and command. 
JSOTF forces were also augmented with conventional assets that served in a 
supporting role and were very effective in use throughout the operation.76 
Figure 4.  Joint Special Operations Task Force Organization Operation JUST 
CAUSE77 
74 Cole, Operation Just Cause, 27–35. 
75 Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The Storming of 
Panama (New York, NY: Lexington Books, 1991), 113. 
76 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned, CALL Bulletin 
(Washington,  DC: U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, 1990), II-3. 
77 Adapted: from U.S. Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command 


















D. MISSIONS ASSIGNED TO SOF 
During planning, SOF was assigned missions including surveillance, airfield 
disruption/siezure, securing vital communications facilities, halting Panamanian Defense 
Force (PDF) armored movements, hostage rescue, and capturing Manuel Noriega.78 
These missions were then assigned to the JSOTF’s subordinate elements based on each 
uint’s operational capabilities. The only true instance of potential forced jointness was the 
assignement of Task Force (TF) White (Naval Special Warfare) to gain control of Paitilla 
Airfield and destroy aircraft used for a potential escape by Noriega. During this operation 
the SEALs sustained four killed in action (KIA) and multiple wounded. The justification 
for assigning the mission to TF White was to ensure “that Navy special operators receive 
a significant mission during the invasion” despite having Army paratroopers and Rangers 
who were specifically prepared for this mission set.79 Many of the assigned subordinate 
units had over two months two conduct coordination and training in support of their 
assigned missions. Several of the elements were able to actually conduct rehearsals on the 
actual objective areas prior to the operation.80 
E. OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF SOF 
During the execution of JUST CAUSE, the JSOTF was effective in the execution 
of its assigned tasks with the exception of the SEALs at Paitilla Airfield. Despite 
effectively executing its assigned tasks, SOF had a disproportionate number of casualties 
in comparison to conventional forces. The JSOTF suffered 11 KIA and over 150 
wounded in a force consisting of approximately 4,150 persons.81 The remaining 23,000 
plus persons comprising the rest of the allocated U.S. forces in the operation had 12 KIA 
and over 150 wounded.82 These numbers do not reflect the fact that the JSOTF elements 
led the invasion and were often exposed to a much higher degree of risk than their 
78 Donnelly, Operation Just Cause, 113.
79 Thomas K. Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional
Warfare (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 223. 
80 Watson and Tsouras, Operation Just Cause, 106.
81 Donnelly, Operation Just Cause, 113.
82 Donnelly, Operation Just Cause, 113.
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conventional counterparts who conducted relief in place operations after SOF elements 
had secured the initial objectives. 
F. KEY TAKEAWAYS 
 Having forces familiar with the operational area was instrumental to
mission planning. SOCSOUTH, however, was aware of its capabilities
and limitations and pushed for a better equipped command to actually run
the operation.
 Dividing the subordinate TFs along service lines improved coordination
and communication.
 Planning for SOF operations was fully nested with CF planning and
limited friction on the battlefield. Unity of effort and the chain of
command (CoC) were clear from the onset of the operation.
 Executing conventional tasks in areas of high risk or where economy of
force is required may be a mission assigned to SOF. SOF leaders must
ensure that tasks assigned match unit capabilities. Fairness does not equal
equality.
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IV. SOF IN SOMALIA
A. BACKGROUND 
In 1991, the government of Somalia collapsed when President Mohammed Siad 
Barre was ousted from power by a “coalition of opposing clans, known as the United 
Somalia Congress.”83 The United Somalia Congress quickly fractured and the two main 
clans led by Ali Mahdi and Mohammed Farah Aidid became engulfed in a civil war.84 
During this period of civil strife widespread famine affected Somalia’s civilain 
population. Western leaders attempted to provide aid to the starving population, but the 
majority of the supplies were intercepted by the warlords.85 In August of 1992, the 
United Nations (UN) intervened to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of 
Somalia. This mission was called UNOSOM I (Operation Provide Relief). During the 




SFG played a minimal role by providing escort to the aircraft that departed from Kenya 
into Somalia to deliver food.86 Despite the efforts undertaken in UNOSOM I, Somali 
warlords were still intercepting relief supplies.  
As a result of the failed efforts of UNSOM I the United States initiated Operation 
RESTORE HOPE in December of 1992 with UN approval. RESTORE HOPE aimed to 
enable relif supply distribution to the population of Somalia by securing the main 
logistical arteries from attack by the warlords. Over 25,000 U.S. forces were employed in 
this effort including SOF. SEALs and SBU from the Marine Expediationary Unit 
supported the initial ampbibious landing by the Marines by conducting hydrographic 
reconnaissance.87 SF moved from Kenya to Somalia and also deployed Forward 
83 “Operation Restore Hope, Battle of Mogadishu, 1993,” NOVA Online, accessed August 1, 2016,
http://novaonline.nvcc.edu/eli/evans/his135/Events/Somalia93/somalia93.html. 
84 “Operation Restore Hope, Battle of Mogadishu, 1993.”
85 “Task Force Ranger 20th Anniversary: The Battle of Mogadishu, Oct. 3, 1993,” Defense Media
Network, June 4, 2013, http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/task-force-ranger-20th-anniversary-
the-battle-of-mogadishu-oct-3-1993/. 
86 U.S. Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command History, 47.
87 U.S. Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command History, 47.
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Operating Base (FOB 52(-)) to provide command and control of all SOF operations as 
Joint Special Operations Forces-Somalia (JSOFOR-SOMALIA).88 RESTORE HOPE 
was able to implement effective means of getting humanitarian aid to the local population 
and the U.S. requested to transition the mission over to UN control by the spring of 1993. 
JSOFOR-SOMALIA redeployed to the United States in April of 1993. When the UN 
took over, the mission the operation was renamed UNOSOM II in May of 1993.89  
UNOSOM II was commanded by Lieutenant General Cervik Bir from Turkey 
with MG Thomas Montogomery serving as his deputy. In addition to his role as the 
UNOSOM II Deputy Commander, MG Montgomery was the commander of United 
States Forces Somalia (USFORSOM) and maintained operational control (OPCON) of 
the UNOSOM logistics command and the only U.S. ground forces in the form of a QRF. 
Essentially, all UNOSOM decisions were driven by the U.S. as all other participants were 
reliant on the U.S. for logistics support. MG Montgomery reported directly to General 
Joseph Hoar, the USCENTCOM Commander and General Bir.  
The objectives for UNOSOM II were “expanded to include: forcibly disarming 
the warring factions; political reconcilitation; and nation building.”90 The expanded 
mission requirements coincided with a massive drawdown of U.S. forces in Somalia. 
This resulted in a degraded operational capability coupled with a more intensive set of 
mission requirements. The mission began to degrade and attacks escalated on the UN 
forces.  
The UN forces began to rely heavily on the limited U.S. forces and MG 
Montogomery insisted on the need for an increased armored U.S. presence, and SOF 
supported by AC-130s to target Aidid and his leaders.  MG Montogmery’s requests were 
echoed by the UN representative in Somalia, Admiral Jonathan Howe. Howe also 
requested USSOF to assist in the capture and arrest of Aidid. This high risk mission was 
an addition to the existing UNOSOM missions alredy being supported by the U.S. MG 
                                                 
88 U.S. Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command History, 48. 
89 U.S. Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command History, 48. 
90 John W. Warner, Review of Circumstances Surrounding the Ranger Raid on October 3–4, 1993 in 
Mogadishu, Somalia (U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 1995), 4. 
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Montogomery’s request for armored assets and AC-130s was denied in an effort to keep 
the footprint on the ground low but the use of USSOF was approved.91  
On August 21, 1993, the deployment of a 440-man Joint Special Operations Task 
Force (JSOTF) to Somalia was approved by the Secretary of Defense Les Aspin.92 The 
JSOTF was Task Force (TF) Ranger and led by the Joint Special Operations Command 
Commander, MG William Garrison. 
B.  MISSION PLANNING 
TF Ranger, led by MG William Garrison, reported directly to General Hoar at 
CENTCOM and only coordinated with other military and civilain forces as needed. 
Planning for operations focused on the capture of Aidid and were not formally 
coordinated with UNOSOM or USFORSOM (Figure 5). The TF Ranger elements were 
not regionally oriented or educated on the culture of their operating environment.  All 
mission planning was tactically focused. 
91 Warner, Review of Circumstances Surrounding the Ranger Raid on October 3–4, 1993, 4–6.
92 Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia, 48.
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Figure 5.  U.S. Forces Operation RESTORE HOPE Task Organization93 
C. TASK ORGANIZATION OF GROUND SOF 
The JSOTF employed for RESTORE HOPE consisted of approximately 440 




 Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), 24
th
 Air Force 
Special Tactics Squadron, and Special Missions Units (Figure 6).94 TF Ranger reported 
directly with the USCENTCOM Commander General Hoar. TF Ranger had no reporting 
or coordinating requirements with any of the UNOSOM II forces or with USFORSOM. 
All coordination that occurred between these units was based on personally established 
relationships withou any formal requirements. General Garrison also coordinated 
informally with the U.S. envoy to Somalia. 
93 Adapted from David Alberts and Richard Hayes, Command Arrangements for Peace Operations.
(United States: NDU Press, 1995), accessed July 28, 2016, “Command Arrangements for Peace 
Operations,” accessed July 28, 2016, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/peace_alberts/recent.html. 
94 Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia, 48.
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Figure 6.  Task Force Ranger Task Organization95 
D. MISSIONS ASSIGNED TO SOF 
TF Ranger was tasked with capturing General Aidid and his lieutenants. Once 
captured they were to be turned over to UNOSOM forces.96 In order to achieve these 
tasks TF Ranger executed primarily special reconnaissance and direct action missions. 
The TF was successful in capturing a number of Aidid’s top lieutentants, but failed to 
complete its’ primary objective of capturing Aidid. 
E. OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF SOF 
TF Ranger executed six missions and aborted 35–40 missions during its 
deployment in support of Operation RESTORE HOPE. The aborted missions were due to 
a lack of intelligence reporting. Of the six missions executed three were night-time 
operations and the remaining three were executed in daylight.97 During the execution of 
these missions many of General Aidid’s top lieutenants were captured, but the primary 
objective, Aidid himself, never was.  
On the last major TF Ranger mission on October 3-4, 1993, two Black Hawk 
helicopters were shot down by Somalis, and 17 U.S. personnel were KIA while another 
106 were wounded as a result of the crashes and ensuing combat.98 This event is often 
referred to as “Black Hawk Down” after the title of the bestselling book by Mark 
95 Adapted from Defense Media Network, “Task Force Ranger 20th Anniversary.”
96 U.S. Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command History, 49.
97 Tucker and Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces, 134–142.
98 U.S. Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command History, 50–52.
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Bowden. This major catastrophe “turned Congress decisively against staying in Somalia” 
and TF Ranger stood down shortly afterwards.99 
Overall, TF Ranger failed to achieve its objectives and its tactical failure during 
“Black Hawk Down” created negative strategic effects for the United States efforts in 
Somalia. TF Ranger also demonstrated that the use of National Mission Force (NMF) for 
C2 is not always the best option in highly complex operating environments.100 
F. KEY TAKEAWAYS 
 SOF operations were not synchronized or clearly coordinated with CF.
The lack of formal coordination had devastating negative effects on
operations. Lack of local area knowledge coupled with limited intelligence
proved catastrophic for TF Ranger. Working in a more coherent fashion
with onsite CF may have increased situational awareness.
 There was no unity of effort amongst all forces involved nor a clear chain
of command. Each element had different objectives and reported through
different leadership channels.
99 Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia, 56–62.
100 Tucker and Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces, 138–139.
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V. THE 2001 INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN 
A. BACKGROUND 
On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda operatives carried out attacks in New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Viriginia that caused 2,973 deaths.101 These attacks drew the United 
States into a global manhunt, searching for any persons who aided or abetted al-Qaeda in 
its efforts. This search quickly led to focus on Afghanistan where the Taliban government 
had provided safe harbor for al-Qaeda and its leaders. Within days of the attacks the 
United States along with a coalition of allies began preparations for deployment of 
combat forces to Afghanistan. 
B. MISSION PLANNING 
At the time of the attack the DOD did not have any ground invasion plans for 
Afghanistan or diplomatic arrangements in place for overflight, basing, or staging with 
any of the countries that lay adjacent to it.102 Quickly the DOD developed courses of 
action that ranged from cruise missle strikes, aerial bombardment, and a combination of 
the two with boots on the ground.103 The President, George W. Bush, did not embrace 
any of the plans and was then briefed by the CIA that they had a network of sources and 
tribes that could be accessed with Afghanistan. With this knowledge the CIA quickly 
became the lead organization in planning for the initial invasion. 
The initial plan called for an initial infiltration of CIA paramilitary elements 
followed by Special Forces Teams. The CIA would activate and coordinate support from 
their network of sources and tribes, and the Special Forces Teams would then work by 
with and through the new partner forces to attack the Taliban and al-Qaeda.104 The 
details of this plan were initially developed by Special Operations Command Central 
101 Leigh Neville, Special Operations, Forces in Afghanistan (Great Britain: Osprey Pub., 2008), 5.
102 Richard D. Camp, Boots on the Ground : The Fight to Liberate Afghanistan from Al-Qaeda and
the Taliban, 2001–2002 (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2011), 92. 
103 Camp, Boots on the Ground, 93.
104 Camp, Boots on the Ground, 93–99.
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Command (SOCCENT) within the initial weeks of the attacks. The plans called for SOF 
elements working alongside the CIA to be split under two subordinate commands that 
divided the country into Northern and Southern regions (Figure 7). Traditional methods 
of targeting key infrastrucutre and leaders were limited due to the decentralized nature of 
the Taliban and caused the force to be primarily reliant on Afghan counterparts that were 
working with the CIA. This led to bottom up refinements in targeting as ground elements 
pushed forward.105  
Figure 7.  U.S. Forces Operation ENDURING FREEDOM106 
C. TASK ORGANIZATION OF GROUND SOF 
Since the planning and execution cycle was compressed, a forward Joint Forces 
Special Operations Component Command (JFSOCC) was not initially established during 
the opening of of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Instead, SOCCENT designated 5
th
Special Forces Group and its commander Colonel John Mulholland as the primary 
coordinators for ground SOF operations in Afghanistan.107 COL Mulholland assumed the 
105 Wright, A Different Kind of War, 48.
106 Adapted from Neville, Special Operations, Forces in Afghanistan, 7.
107 Hy S. Rothstein, “A Tale of Two Wars: Why the U.S. Cannot Conduct Unconventional Warfare”
(PhD diss., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2004), 189. 
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responsibilities of the JFSOCC for coordinating all SOF efforts in country as well as the 
duties of the Joint SOF Commander for all allies in addition to his main task as the 
commander of Joint Special Operations Task Force North (TF-Dagger).108  
The 5
th
 Group staff was nearly overwhelmed by the excess of responsibilities
bestowed upon it due to its small staff size and lack of dedicated planners. It did however 
provide direct access for COL Mulholland to the CENTCOM commander General 
Tommy Franks.109   
Afghanistan was then further broken down into Northern and Southern sectors 
and two separate SOF commands were established to control subordinate SOF elements 
in those respective areas. The third SOF Command TF 11(TF Dagger) was comprised of 
NMF assets and was focused on identfying high value CT targets throughout the 
country.110 TF-Dagger, led by COL Mulholland, worked in the northern portion of 
Afghanistan while Joint Special Operations task Force South (TF K-Bar), led by Navy 
SEAL Captain Robert Harward, owned the southern portion of the country (Figure 8). TF 
K-Bar also included numerous coalition SOF forces.111  
This command relationship caused confusion as JSOTF-N and JSOTF-S were 
OPCON to CFSOCC but also were TACON to SOCCENTs Combined Force Land 
Component Command (CFLCC).112 TF K-Bar also had the additional responsibility of 
coordinating and mutually supporting TF 58 (U.S. Marine Corps).113 
108 Wright, A Different Kind of War, 67.
109 Wright, A Different Kind of War, 67.
110 Neville, Special Operations, Forces in Afghanistan, 8–10.
111 Neville, Special Operations, Forces in Afghanistan, 8.
112 “Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command (CFSOCC), Special Operations
Command Central (SOCCENT),” Global Security, accessed October 27, 2016, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/soccent-cfsocc.htm. 
113 “Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - South (CJSOTF-S) (Afghanistan) / ‘Task Force
Ka-Bar,” Global Security, accessed October 27, 2016, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/
cjsotf-s-af.htm. 
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By December 2001, SOCCENT established one primary headquarters element 
and three subordinate command and control forces. The overall ground USSOF HQ in 
theater was the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan.114  
Figure 8.  CJSOTF Task Organization115 
D. MISSIONS ASSIGNED TO SOF 
During the execution of Operation Enduirng Freedom-Afghanistan, missions 
assigned to SOF morphed over time as the organizations footprint and logistical support 
structure increased. 
Initially, TF-Dagger was assigned the mission of coordinating and providing 
combat search and rescue (CSAR) for coalition aircrews.116 TF Dagger never executed 
this mission. TF Dagger then transitioned into an unconventional warfare (UW) role 
advising and assisting partner forces in the the removal of the Taliban government.117 
TF K-Bar was assigned the task finding and removing any Taliban and Al Qaeda 
elements as well as elimingating their ability to conduct future operations. TF K-Bar also 
was tasked with providing support to TF 58.118 The predominance of their operations 
114 Global Security, “Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command (CFSOCC),
Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT).” 
115 Adapted from Neville, Special Operations, Forces in Afghanistan, 7.
116 Wright, A Different Kind of War, 67.
117 “Joint Special Operations Task Force - North (JSOTF-N) / ‘Task Force Dagger,’” Global Security,
accessed October 27, 2016, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/jsotf-n-af.htm.  
118 Global Security, “Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - South (CJSOTF-S)
(Afghanistan) / ‘Task Force Ka-Bar.” 
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were focused on reconaissance and surveillance with the remainder on general combat 
operations. 
E. OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF SOF 
In both cases, the task forces executed a variety of operations but were used 
primarily in a conventional manner. In the North TF Dagger was heavily involved in the 
coordination of air strikes, but also partictipated in special reconnaissance and direct 
action. TF K-Bar also executed some SOF tasks such as special reconnaissance and direct 
action. Both forces were an economy of force option and produced results that normally 
require much larger units. Both units were sucessful in their operations as the Taliban 
was removed from power within months of the invasion and Al Qaeda was rooted out of 
Afghanistan. As the intial contingency operation morphed from with the influx of large 
ground troop formations, both TFs modified their roles. 
F. KEY TAKEAWAYS 
 Unity of effort is more important than unity of command. Interagency
cooperation was critical to the execution of the mission.
 DOD is not always postured to lead or coordinate mission execution. This
also applies to general purpose forces (GPF) as SOF may be better
equipped to lead an operation with GPF acting in a subordinate role.
 A flattened command structure leads to improved speed of execution and
clarity in understanding the mission (Mulholland had direct access to
Franks). TF K-Bar had a diluted CoC and struggled to understand who
was calling the shots.119
119 Global Security, “Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - South (CJSOTF-S)
(Afghanistan) / ‘Task Force Ka-Bar.” 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
CJSOTF and SOC-FWD models used to fill the role of TF level command and 
control have had varying degrees of success across a range of operations. The designs are 
meant to be flexible and adjusted to meet the needs of the operating environment much 
like an open organization.  
During Operation JUST CAUSE, the JSOTF acted in a manner similar to what is 
expected of a modern SOC-FWD as the planners and many of the executors had a high 
degree of understanding of the battlespace. The invasion of Panama also took advantage 
of regionally aligned forces when able, which further facilitated coordination and 
execution. SOCSOUTH was cognizant of its existing tasks and its limited ability to 
conduct C2 for a large operation and smartly petitioned to have a more functionally 
capable command take charge of SOF forces during the operation. This coupled with a 
moderately lengthy planning cycle, helped develop a sound operational plan. Overall, this 
operation serves as a good example of how ground SOF operations should be planned 
and coordinated.  
During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-A, many of the advantages afforded 
to the planners and executors of JUST CAUSE were not available. The plan did adhere to 
a simplified chain of command with flattened communications between ground elements 
and senior leaders that enabled quick decision making and reduced ambiguity on the 
battlefield. Unity of effort was also stressed and basic planning principles were adhered 
to and improved results on the ground. Effect efficient communication and maintaining 
basic SOF planning principles were critical to the initial success. Only after the command 
structure began to expand and more CF forces were added to the battlespace did the 
operational picture begin to muddy.  
In Somalia, many of the planning and coordination tenets that made the 
operations in Panama and Afghanistan successful were not executed and failure ensued. 
Having multiple chains of command and no formal coordination responsibilities with CF 
was the beginning of a disaster in the making. This was further exacerbated by employing 
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TF Ranger in a mode similar to a on call contingency response force separate from 
ongoing operations and executing an independent targeting strategy. Before SOF arrived 
in Somalia mission creep was rampant and coordination with CF may not have prevented 
the botched operation in Mogadishu, but it could not have made the situation any worse. 
Unity of effort and command are key to mission success. When SOF forces are not fully 
coordinating with all battlefield partners, ambiguity and the likelihood of mission failure 
increases. 
Using a regionally aligned force or a standing C2 contingency unit will likely 
have similar difficulties as a CJSOTF or SOC-FWD if the aforementioned points are not 
addressed. In all case studies the preponderance of forces comprising the HQ elements 
were formed around homogenous commands and not a TSOC staff with limited training 
and minimal SOF representation. In Panama, the actual HQ element came from JSOC, in 
Somalia JSOC supported it as well, and 5
th
 SFG was the primary C2 organization in
Afghanistan. In each of these cases the minimum level of command capable of 
organizing all ground SOF forces was at the O-6 level (Colonel/Captain). In two of the 
cases the commander was the rank of Major General. Having a leader that outranks the 
leaders of subordinate commands is critical in organizing the force along service lines as 
well as for external coordination with JTF leaders and adjacent commands. As future 
battlefields become more distributed, the actual decision making occurs at a lower 
tactical level, but overall operational planning and synchronization still need to occur at 
the operational or strategic level with minimal interference between the two. 
Ultimately, the existing organizations for the C2 of SOF ground forces function, 
but need to be adjusted to the needs of the operating environment to improve 
effectiveness. They are most effective when they effectively achieve unity of effort, a 
clear chain of command, flattened command structure and communications, and have 
clearly delineated and understood tasks. Homogenous units at the group and regimental 
levels or above should be capable of executing these responsibilities on a rotational basis 
based on geographic region. The TSOCs are not ideal for these types of large-scale 
limited contingency operations. The TSOCs should be responsible for maintaining 
accurate intelligence and infrastructure in their respective AORs to facilitate units 
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designated to execute C2. If the current prescribed method of having TSOCs actually C2 
operations persists, USSOCOM needs to effectively address the personnel and training 
shortfalls that currently exist within them.  
Key principles derived from the case studies include: 
1. When organizations incorporate sound fundamentals, such as full
integration with conventional force (CF) planning and possessing unity of
effort with a clear chain of command, they resemble adaptive
organizations and their likelihood of success is increased dramatically.
These principles were critical in the outcome of each case study.
2. Minimizing the chain of command flattens communications between
ground elements and senior leaders and enables quick decision making
and reduces ambiguity on the battlefield.
3. Regionally aligned forces have the potential to better facilitate the
initiation of operations due to familiarity with the population and terrain.
This supports more efficient execution during the initial stages of an
operation.
4. Having a leader that outranks the leaders of subordinate commands is
critical in organizing the force along service lines as well as for external
coordination with JTF leaders and adjacent commands.
5. Homogenous commands including Marine special operations forces
(MARSOF), Army special operations forces (ARSOF), and Naval special
operations forces (NAVSOF) have the ability to be staffed and trained to
provide a more effective response for command and control than a TSOC
on a continual basis.
The actual success of a TF level command and control element is also affected by 
a number of additional factors that this research did not address, such as command 
climate, fiscal resources, and logistics support available, etc. This research is not meant to 
provide all-encompassing guidance to commanders, but rather is to be used as a tool that 
demonstrates how certain principles have had positive and negative effects in prior SOF 
operations and how they can influence future operations. 
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